– Vo Nguyen Giap

At  the beginning  there   were  at  Dien  Bien  Phu  only  ten  enemy battalions  but  they  were  gradually  reinforced  to  cope  with our offensive.    When we  launched the attack, the enemy forces totalled

17 battalions   and 10 companies, comprising chiefly Europeans and Africans  and  crack units  of   paratroops.  Moreover  the  camp had three battalions of artillery, one battalion of sappers, one  armoured company, a transport unit of  200 trucks and a permanent squadron of 12 aircraft. In all, 16,200 men.

Those  forces were distributed  into  three sub-sectors which had to support one another and comprised 49 strong-points.   Each was a defence centre,  while several were grouped into “complex defence centres” equipped with mobile  forces and artillery,  and surrounded by trenches  and barbed wire hundreds of  metres  thick. Each sub- sector comprised many strong-fortified   defence centres.

The most  important  was the central  sub-sector situated  in Muong Thanh village, the centre of the Dien Bien Phu district.   Two-thirds of the garrison  were   concentrated  here.   It  had several  connected defence  centres  protecting the command post, the   artillery  and commissariat  bases, as  well   as  the  airfield.    To   the east,  well- situated hills formed the most important defence system of the sub- sector.   Dien  Bien  Phu  was  considered  by the  enemy  to  be  an unassailable    and impregnable  fortress.  In  fact,  the  central  sub- sector  did have  rather  strong  forces,  and  the  heights  in the  east could not be attacked  easily.  Besides  the artillery  and armoured forces could break  every attempted  assault  through the  plain,  a system of  barbed  wire and  trenches  would permit  the enemy to

decimate  and repel  any assault, and the mobile  forces formed by the battalions  of  paratroops, whose action was combined  with that of    the  defence   centres,   could  counter-attack   and  break  any offensive.

The northern  sub-sector  comprised the defence centres of Him  Lam, Doc  Lap  and Ban Keo.    The very strong  positions  of  Him  Lam  and Doc  Lap  were to check all attacks of  our troops coming  from Tuan Giao and Lai Chau.

As for  the southern sub-sector, also known as Hong Cum sub-sector, it was to break any offensive  coming  from the south and to protect the  communications with Upper Laos.

The  enemy  artillery  was  divided  into  two bases:  one  at  Muong Thanh,  the  other  at    Hong Cum, arranged  in such  a  way as  to support each other and to support all the surrounding strong-points.

Dien Bien Phu had  two airfields:  besides  the main  field at  Muong Thanh, there was a reserve airstrip  at  Hong Cum; they  linked the camp with Hanoi and  Haiphong  through an airlift which ensured 60 to 80 planeloads of supply daily.

The reconnaissance and fighter planes of  the permanent squadron constantly  flew over the entire region.   The planes from the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airbases had the task of strafing and bombing our  army.

General  Navarre  asserted  that  with such powerful forces and  so strong a  defence  system,   Dien  Bien  Phu  was  “an  impregnable fortress….”.  The American  general  O’Daniel  who paid  a visit to the base  shared  this  opinion.   From this  subjective  point  of  view, the enemy came to the conclusion that our troops had  little chance of success  in an attack  on Dien Bien Phu.  They even considered  that such an attack would be a good opportunity  for  them  to inflict a severe defeat on us.

On our side,  after  the liberation  of  Lai  Chau, an attack  upon Dien Bien Phu was on the  agenda.    We considered  that the base, well entrenched as it was,  had  vulnerable  points.    In  attacking  it,  we would face enormous  difficulties in strategy, tactics and supply, but these difficulties could  be  overcome.    After  having  analysed  the situation and weighed the pros and cons, we  decided to attack Dien Bien  Phu  according  to  the  watchword: relentless  attack,  steady advance.    Our    tactics  would be  to  attack  the  enemy  defence centres, the various  parts of  the entrenched camp one by one, thus creating  conditions  for   the  launching  of   a  general  offensive  to annihilate the whole camp.

Three  months had passed from the occupation of  Dien Bien Phu by enemy paratroops to the launching  of  our campaign.  During that time,  the  enemy   did  their  utmost  to  consolidate  their  defence system, bring in reinforcements, dig new trenches, and strengthen their   entrenchments.  On our   side,  the army and people  actively prepared  the  offensive.   Carrying  out  the   orders   of   the  Party’s Central  Committee  and the  Government, they mustered  all  their strength to guarantee the success of the Winter-Spring campaign, of which Dien Bien Phu was the  keystone.     Our  troops succeeded in liberating  the surrounding  regions,  isolating  Dien Bien Phu, forcing the  enemy to scatter  forces and thus reduce their  possibilities  of sending reinforcements  to the battlefield.    We made  motor roads, cleared  tracks to haul up artillery  pieces,  built casemates for  the artillery,  prepared the ground for  the offensive  and encirclement;  in short, we  transformed   the battlefield   terrain  with a view to solving our tactical problems.   Very great  difficulties were  overcome.    We called  upon our local compatriots  to supply  food, to set up supply lines hundreds of kilometers long from Thanh Hoa or  Phu Tho  to the North-West, through rugged terrain paths and very high passes.  We used every means to carry food and ammunition to the front.  Our troops  and  voluntary  workers  ceaselessly  went  to  the  front and actively participated in the preparations under the attacks of enemy aircraft.

In  the  first week  of  March,  the preparations were completed;  the artillery    had    solid   casemates,   the   operational    bases   were established,            food          and ammunition fttp://cpimorg@cpim.org/public_html on were available in sufficient quantity.   After having studied the aim and significance of the campaign, all officers and soldiers were filled  with a very high determination to annihilate the enemy, as they were persuaded that only the destruction of  the  Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp would bring the “Navarre plan” to complete failure.

On  March  13,  1954,  our troops  received  the  order to launch  an offensive against Dien Bien Phu.

The  campaign  proceeded in  three phases: in the  first  phase  we destroyed the northern sub-sector; in the  second,  the  longest and bitterest  one, we   took the heights  in the  east  of  the central  sub- sector and tightened our encirclement; in the third, we  launched the general offensive and annihilated the enemy.

First phase: destruction of the northern sub–sector

This phase  began  on March  13th  and ended on March  17th. On the night of March 13th, we  annihilated the very strong defence centre of Him  Lam  which overlooked  the road from Tuan  Giao to   Dien Bien

Phu.  The battle was very fierce, the enemy artillery concentrated its fire,  and  poured  scores  of  thousands of  shells  on our  assaulting waves.    Our   troops  carried  the position  in  the  night.    This first victory  had  very  deep  repercussions  on the  development  of  the whole campaign.

On the night of  the 14th, we  concentrated  our forces to attack the defence centre of  Doc  Lap, the second strong point of  the northern sub-sector  which overlooked  the road from Lai  Chau to Dien Bien Phu.  The battle  went on till dawn.  The enemy used every means to repel our forces,  fired scores  of  thousands of  shells and sent their mobile  forces   protected  by tanks  from  Muong Thanh  to support their  position.    Our   troops fought heroically,  took the strong-point and repelled the enemy reinforcements.

The third  and  last  defence  centre of  the northern sub-sector, the Ban Keo  post, became isolated  and was threatened  by us.      This was a less strong position, manned by a garrison   chiefly made up of puppet soldiers.  On March  17th, the whole garrison  left   its  position and surrendered.   After  the loss  of  the  northern sub-sector, the central sub-sector, now exposed on its eastern and northern flanks, was threatened.

In the phase of the fighting, the correctness of our tactical decisions, the  good  organisation  of   our  anti-aircraft  defence   reduced the effectiveness  of   the  enemy artillery  and  air  force.  Besides,  our artillery  fire, which was very accurate, inflicted  heavy losses on the enemy.   The main airfield was threatened. Our  anti-aircraft batteries which were going went into action for  the  first time, brought  down many enemy planes.      But above  all, it was by their  heroic  spirit, their high spirit of  sacrifice  and their   determination  to win, that our troops distinguished themselves during those battles.

The great  and  resounding  victory which ended  the  first phase  of operations stirred our army and people  and gave each and every one faith in final victory.

As   for    the  enemy,  despite   their   heavy  losses,   they   still  had confidence  in the   power of  resistance  of  the central  sub-sector, in the strength of their artillery and air force.  They even expected that we  would suffer heavy losses  and would be obliged  to give  up the offensive; and especially,  that if  the campaign  was protracted our supply lines would be cut and that  the great  logistic difficulties thus created would force us to withdraw.

Second phase: Occupation of the hills in the east and encirclement of the central sub–sector

The second  phase  was the   most  important  of  the campaign.    We had to deal  with the central  sub-sector, in the middle  of  the Muong Thanh   plain,   and   new  difficulties  arose   in  the   conduct   of   the operations.    Our    troops  had  to  work actively  to  complete  the preparations; they had to dig a vast  network of  trenches,  from the neighboring hills to the plain, to encircle the central sub-sector and cut it off  from the southern sector.  This advance of our lines which encircled  the  enemy positions  was made  at  the  cost  of   fierce fighting. By every means the enemy tried to  upset our preparations by the action of  their  air  force and artillery.  However, our troops drew ever closer to their positions through uninterrupted fighting.

During  the  night  of   March  30th,  the  second phase  began.    We launched a large scale attack to capture the heights in the east  and a certain number of strong-points in the west in order to tighten our encirclement, and to hamper and cut off supplies to the garrison.

On the  night of  March  30th, we   concentrated important  forces to attack simultaneously the five fortified heights in the east.   On that same night, we  succeeded in capturing hills E-1, D-1 and  C-1, but could not take hill  A-1, the most important of  all.  The defence line constituted by these   heights  was the key to the defensive  system of  the central sub-sector: its loss would lead to the fall of  Dien Bien Phu.  Consequently, the fight  here was the fiercest.    Particularly on hill  A-1,  the   last  height  which protected the command post, the battle lasted until April 4th.  Every inch of ground was hotly disputed. Finally,   we    occupied   half  of   the  position   while  the      enemy, entrenched in casemates  and trenches, continued to resist  in the other half.   While this fighting was going on, the garrison received paratroop  reinforcements.   On   April  9th,  the  enemy  launched   a counter-attack  to re-occupy hill  C-1.   The battle  went  on for  four days and nights, and the position  was occupied  half by the  enemy and half by us.

While the  situation  in the  east  was static,  in the   north  and in the west our encirclement  grew tighter  and  tighter.   The lines  of  both sides  drew nearer  and  nearer  to each  other,  in some  points  they were  only  10  to  15  metres   apart.     From  our  newly-occupied positions to our frontlines northward  and  westward,  the  fire of  our artillery  and mortars pounded the enemy without let-up.    Day and night the fighting went on.  We exhausted the enemy by harassing them,  firing constantly  at their  lines,  and at the same time tried  to take   their    strong-points    one   by   one   by   combining    nibbling operations and full-scale attack.

In  mid-April,  after  the destruction of  several  enemy positions  in the north and the west, our lines  reached the airfield, then  cut it from west to east.   As our  encirclement  grew  still tighter,  the  fighting became  fiercer.     The  enemy   launched  several  violent  counter- attacks   supported by tanks and aircraft  aimed  at taking  ground from us and forcing us to loosen our encirclement. On April 24th, the most violent counter-attack was launched with the aim of driving us from  the  airfield: after  inflicting heavy  losses  on the  enemy, we remained the master, and the airfield stayed  under our control.

The territory occupied by the  enemy  shrank  in size day by day to become  only two  kilometers  square  and    was under  continuous heavy  fire.   The enemy’s supply  problem  became more and more critical.   The airfield having been out of  action for  a long time,  all supplied  were dropped by parachute.   But as the enemy zone was too narrow, and their  pilots  feared  our anti-aircraft  fire and  dared not  fly   low,    only a  part  of   the  parachutes  carrying   food  and ammunition  fell into the enemy positions, while the bulk of them fell on our ground; thus we  poured shells  parachuted by the enemy on the entrenched camp.

Throughout  the second phase, the situation  was extremely  tense. The  American  interventionists  sent  more bombers and  transport planes  to  support  the  Dien Bien Phu base.    The enemy  bombers were very active; they ceaselessly bombed our positions, dropped napalm      bombs  to  burn  down  the  vegetation  on  the  heights surrounding  Dien Bien Phu, and  bombed  points  that they thought were our artillery  bases.    Day and night they shelled  our supply lines,  dropped  block-busters  on  the  roads,  showered them  with delayed-action    and   “butterfly”    anti-personnel    bombs,    in   an endeavour to cut our supply lines.   These desperate efforts did not achieve the desired results.  They could not check the flow  of tens of thousands of   voluntary  carriers,  pack-horses  and  trucks bringing food and  ammunition  to  the  front.   They could  not  stop  us  from carrying  out our plan  of  encirclement,  which was to hasten  their doom.

The French and American generals then realised the danger of  the destruction of the Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp.  At one moment, the  High Command  of  the French Expeditionary  Corps thought  of gathering its remaining forces for  an attack  on our rear   and in the direction  of   Viet  Bac,  to  cut  our  supply  lines  and  force  us  to withdraw for  lack of food and ammunition. But it could not  carry out this plan.  Moreover,  it feared  that  a still more severe  defeat  could be the result of  so foolhardy  an action. At  another time it intended to  regroup  the  Dien Bien Phu garrison  in  several  columns  which would try to  break through our encirclement and open at all costs a way towards  Upper Laos.    Finally, it had  to give  up this plan,  too, and continue to defend its positions.

Third phase: Annihilation of the enemy

On May 1st, began the third phase. From May 1st  to May 6th, following several  successive  attacks, we  occupied  hill  C-1, hill  A-1 which  was the key of  the last defensive system of  the central sub-sector, and several  other strong-points  from the foot of  the hills  in the east to the  Nam Rom river,  and  finally some  positions  in the  west.    The enemy were driven  into  a square kilometer,  entirely  exposed to our fire.  There was no  fortified height to protect  them.   The problem of supply became extremely grave.   The situation was critical: the last hour of the entrenched camp had struck.

On the  afternoon  of   May  7th,  from the  east  and  the  west,  we launched  a massive  combined  attack  upon the  headquarters  at Muong Thanh.  On several  posts, the enemy hoisted  the white flag and  surrendered.    At   5.30  p.m.,  we    seized   the  headquarters: General   de  Castries   and  his  staff  were  captured.     Then   the remaining  forces at  Dien Bien Phu surrendered.   The   prisoners  of war were well  treated by our troops.

The “Determined  to Fight and  Win”   banner of  our army fluttered high in the  valley  of  Dien Bien Phu.   That  very night, we  attacked the southern sub-sector.    The whole garrison  of  more than 2,000 men was captured.

The historic Dien Bien Phu campaign ended  in our complete victory. Our  troops had fought with unprecedented  heroism  for  55 days and 55 nights.

During that  time,  our  troops  were  very  active  in  all theatres of operations in coordination with the main front.

In the enemy’s rear in the Red River delta, they destroyed, one after another, a large  number of  positions  and seriously  threatened Road No. 5.

In the Fifth Zone, they attacked  Road No. 19, annihilated the mobile regiment No. 100, liberated An Khe, penetrated deep into the region of Cheo Reo, and threatened Pleiku and Banmethuot.

Our  troops were also very active  in Binh-Tri-Thien and in Nam Bo.

In Middle Laos, the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao units increased their activities on Road No. 9 and advanced southward.

Our  troops won victories on all fronts.

That is a broad  outline of  the  military situation in winter 1953 and sprint 1954.

On  all  fronts,  we   put  out  of   action  112,000  enemy  troops  and brought down or  destroyed on the ground 177 planes.

At  Dien  Bien  Phu,  we   put  out  of   action  16,200  enemy  troops, including the whole command of the entrenched camp, one general, 16 colonels, 1,749  officers and non-commissioned officers, brought down or  destroyed on the ground 62 planes  of  all types,  seized  all the enemy’s armaments,  ammunition  equipment, and more than 30,000 parachutes.

Those   great victories of  the Vietnam People’s Army and people at Dien  Bien  Phu  and  on  the  other  fronts  smashed  to  pieces  the “Navarre  plan”,  and  foiled  the  attempts  of   the Franco-American imperialists to prolong and extend the war.  Those great victories liberated the North of    Vietnam, contributed to the success of  the Geneva Conference and the restoration of peace  in Indochina on the basis   of   respect  for   the  sovereignty,   independence,   unity  and territorial  integrity  of  Vietnam  and of  the  two  friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos.

Those are glorious pages  in the history of our People’s army and our people.    They illustrate  the striking  success of  our party  in leading the movement for  national liberation against the French imperialists and the American interventionists.

Vo   Nguyen   Giap  was  the   Commander-in-chief   of  the  Vietnam People’s   Army.  He  was  a   member  of  the  Polit   Bureau of  the Communist Party of Vietnam.   He later became the Defence Minister of Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Source: https://cpim.org/…/mar…/200401-marxist-Dien-Bien-Phu.pdf